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Evidence obtained in this study shows that a successful CONOP product contains 
minimal informational requirements for approval and an effective CONOP procedure is 
supported by a targeting methodology with lower delegation of authority for CONOP 
approval.   
The CONOP is used by special operations forces (SOF) and other units to gain 
concurrence for an operation by its higher headquarters. It is typically a PowerPoint slide 
presentation submitted by a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) or 
another similar combat unit in order to describe the type of operation, the operation’s 
level of risk, the assets required to conduct the operation, and when the operation is to 
take place. Concurrence can typically take up to 72 hours for a high-risk operation or up 
to 48 hours for a medium-risk operation after the CONOP is submitted through the chain 
of command. SOF uses the CONOP procedure to deconflict operations, assign resources, 
and to demonstrate how the operation is nested within the operational priorities of the 
battle space owner as well as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(CJSOTF) commander. This study examines what makes a successful CONOP and what 
constitutes an effective CONOP procedure.   
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This study provides an analysis and evaluation of the current Concept of the Operation 
(CONOP) procedure and CONOP product used by Special Operations Task Forces 
(SOTFs) to approve Special Forces Operational Detachment-A (SFODA) operations. The 
methods utilized for this study are statistical summaries, correlation, and regression 
analyses. The results of the data show that there are elements of the CONOP procedure 
and its product that can be improved to accelerate the CONOP approval process, and 
increase flexibility and agility for SFODAs. A brief summary of the findings of this study 
are: 
1. Frequent reformatting and reorganization of slides by staff are significant factors 
in CONOP delay. Constant changes to the format not only delay approval times, 
but make familiarization and teaching the CONOP procedure challenging. 
2. Delays in staffing requests for non-organic resources, specifically rotary-wing and 
ISR assets, are the most significant reason for delay of CONOP approval for 
medium-risk and high-risk operations. 
3. Despite well-developed targeting procedures employed throughout Special Forces 
units, SOTF staffs and SFODAs do not usually forecast operations more than one 
week in advance. Due to the lack of long-range forecasting of Special Forces 
operations, staffs and SFODAs have been at a disadvantage when competing with 
conventional forces for rotary-wing and ISR assets. 
4. The most significant variables affecting CONOP approval are:  staff feedback to 
the SOFDAs; the SFODAs adaptability to the CONOP procedure and its product; 
non-organic resource scarcity; nesting (aligning) the CONOP with CONOPS at 
higher echelons; staff oversight of critical resource requirements for the operation; 
and the amount of informational requirements for the CONOP product.1 
                                                 
1 A nested concept is a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding 
echelon’s concept of operation is aligned by purpose with the higher echelon’s concept of operations.  
Department of the Army, The Operations Process: Field Manual (FM) 5-0, (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2010), 2-95. 
 xvi 
These variables impact the SFODA’s ability to achieve CONOP approval, and 
consequently to conduct operations in a timely manner, that by extension, provides 
effects to the commander and the battle-space owner in a timely manner. To this end, this 
study recommends the following be implemented by CJSOTF commanders to streamline 
the CONOP approval process: 
1. Replace the low-risk and medium-risk CONOP with the 5W format (Who, What, 
When, Where, Why).2  Retain the high-risk CONOP for operations that require 
high-demand resources, have strong potential for political repercussions, and 
present high risk to the force. Medium-risk CONOPs can be prepared for the 
SOTF commander if there is especially keen competition for resources. Use the 
format recommended in this study for the medium-risk and high-risk CONOPs. 
2. Assign approval authority for the 5W format to the detachment commander. 
Medium-risk CONOPs can be approved by the AOB commander, but the SOTF 
commander should approve medium-risk CONOPs requiring rotary-wing and ISR 
assets. Assign approval authority of the high-risk CONOPs to the SOTF 
commander, with the caveat of keeping the CJSOTF commander informed of the 
operation. 
3. Implement a targeting procedure by the SOTF staff to closely track critical high-
demand resources, specifically rotary-wing and ISR assets. Utilize the targeting 
procedure to drive the CONOP process, in order to maximize visibility of critical 
resources, and increase the SOTF’s competitiveness for non-organic assets. 
4. Attach more rotary-wing and ISR assets to the SOTFs. There is creditable 
evidence in this study that Special Forces units require more of these non-organic 
resources in order to maintain operational agility in combat, which would also 
further accelerate CONOP approval. 
                                                 
2 The 5W is a simple text document that states the Who (the SFODA), What (the mission), When (the 
time of the operation and specific timeline), Where (the place of the operation), and Why (the purpose) of 
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For the first few years of the GWOT we seemed to survive quite well with 
a 5W process that was transmitted over PDC and SATCOM. The CONOP 
process did not go viral until everyone had access to SIPR terminals and 
PowerPoint.3  –Sergeant Major, Special Forces veteran 
 
The concept of the operation (CONOP) process continues to be the method for 
deconfliction, synchronization, assigning assets, and demonstrating how the operation is 
nested with the battle space owner. Given the proliferation and expansion of the CONOP 
process in the U.S. military and its doctrinal emphasis in special operations forces (SOF), 
the CONOP procedure deserves attention in order to achieve further optimization and 
standardization. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The CONOP is used by SOF and other units in Afghanistan to gain concurrence 
for an operation by its higher headquarters. It is typically a PowerPoint slide presentation 
submitted by a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) or another 
similar combat unit in order to describe the type of operation, the operation’s level of 
risk, the assets required to conduct the operation, and when the operation is to take place. 
Concurrence can typically take up to 72 hours for a high-risk operation or up to 48 hours 
for a medium-risk operation after the CONOP is submitted through the chain of 
command. 
SOF uses the CONOP procedure to deconflict operations, assign resources, and to 
demonstrate how the operation is nested within the operational priorities of the battle 
space owner as well as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) 
commander.   
                                                 
3Subject 69. Anonymous Sergeant Major, Special Forces, 18Z, Afghanistan veteran, question 61.   
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B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to review the CONOP procedure used by Special 
Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) in support of current and future operations and 
determine if the CONOP process or the CONOP product can be improved. 
This study does not address how CONOP approval affects mission success or 
mission failure. This is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, mission success or 
failure is dependent on a significant amount of causal variables. This study focuses on the 
independent variables that attribute to CONOP approval in order to streamline the 
CONOP procedure. Nevertheless, this study does state that a sensible, well-timed 
CONOP approval process is desired in the Special Forces community. 
Speed is of value in its own right because it equates to precious time for the 
detachment and intelligence for the operation. Slow CONOP procedures, due to an 
increase in informational requirements and higher approval authority, can distract the 
SFODA because the focus of the SFODA can become the CONOP product in order to 
achieve approval. Precious time for the SFODA is spent on activities for the CONOP 
product rather than activities for the operation, such as rehearsals and a detailed OPORD. 
Time, when it is given to a lengthy CONOP procedure, can degrade intelligence, 
attributing unforeseen factors to the mission and allowing enemies to prepare. 
Is a lengthy CONOP procedure of value? Commanders can take more time to 
make decisions with high-risk CONOPs. Additionally, given more time with the CONOP 
product, the SOTF staff and the SFODAs can strengthen the CONOPs with doctrine and 
imagery and increase the chances for approval. Despite these considerations, not one 
subject in the survey stated that current CONOP procedure and the CONOP product is 
fine the way it is; however, there were numerous comments from the subjects that stated 
the CONOP procedure needs to be streamlined for the SFODAs. Time does not equal 
staff feedback to the detachment nor does it equal integration between the staff and the 
SFODA. These procedures should hasten a CONOP procedure, not slow it. Therefore, 
speed, based on the comments from the subjects, is vital for an efficient CONOP 
procedure while slowness is considered adverse. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can the CONOP procedure be improved? 
D. THE BENEFITS TO THE REGIMENT FOR CONDUCTING THIS 
STUDY 
This study will examine the CONOP product and what constitutes an effective 
CONOP procedure. A comprehensive review of the CONOP and related doctrines will 
potentially increase the efficiency of future SOTF operations. In addition, this study will 
capture lessons from the CONOP procedure and analyze how and why the CONOP has 
evolved into its current state. Finally, this study will examine if there is any potential to 
codify the CONOP and its procedure and establish them in doctrine.   
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Doctrinal sources will provide the frame of reference for terminology as well as a 
structure for the targeting methodology offered at the end of this thesis. There are scarce 
references in literature or conventional doctrine that will support any examination of the 
CONOP process. However, there is published doctrine that supports developing a 
targeting method in order to streamline and speed the CONOP procedure. U.S. Army 
doctrine offers the best sources to reference the practice in the targeting methodology 
(see Table 1). Doctrine further provides the reference to intelligence practices that 










Author Reference Contribution 
Department  
of Defense4 
FM 3–60, The Targeting Process Describes the targeting 
methodology used today 






FM 2–0, Intelligence Provides guidance to 





FM 3–05, Army Special 
Operations Forces 
Provides the commander 
and the staff a broad 
understanding of Army 
Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF) and the guidance 






JP 1-02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms 
The reference for common 
military definitions and 
terminology found in this 
thesis 
Table 1.   Doctrinal References. 
 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This study will survey members of the U.S. Army Special Forces in order to 
examine the CONOP process. The survey will be divided into CONOP procedures and 
the CONOP product. First, the survey will collect qualitative data from the subjects. 
Next, the survey will gather data that covers actions by the SFODA and the staff prior to 
                                                 
4 Department of Defense, The Targeting Process: Field Manual (FM) 3-60. Headquarters Department 
of the Army, November 2010. 
5 Department of Defense, Intelligence: Field Manual (FM) 2-0. Headquarters Department of the 
Army, March 2010. 
6 Department of Defense, Army Special Operations Forces: Field Manual (FM) 3–05. Headquarters 
Department of the Army, December 2010. 
7 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-
02.Department of Defense, November 8, 2010. 
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CONOP submission and then collect data covering detachment planning and coordination 
with the staff post CONOP submission. Finally, the survey will collect data on the 
CONOP’s structure and characteristics within the CONOP that demonstrate the 
operational picture to the commander and staff. By conducting a large-scale survey, this 
study aims to provide a comprehensive and analytic review of the CONOP process. To 
this date, such systematic research has not been conducted in order to consider how to 
optimize the CONOP process.  
This survey will follow the procedures of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.8 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY/CHAPTER REVIEW 
This study is organized into several parts: survey results, analysis of the survey, 
and recommendations to the CONOP procedure. Following the introduction, chapter II 
begins with the survey results. This chapter highlights the survey design, survey 
distribution, and an overview of the survey data.  Chapter III discusses the CONOP and 
the CONOP procedure. During this chapter, Afghanistan and Iraq CONOP procedures 
are compared. In Chapter IV, this study focuses on the delays to CONOP approval for 
Afghanistan and Iraq low-risk, medium-risk, and high-risk CONOPs. Chapter V focuses 
on staff oversight and resource allocation for CONOPS in Afghanistan and Iraq. Chapter 
VI discusses codifying the CONOP product and argues why the CONOP product should 
be standardized and put into doctrine. Next, chapter VII discusses the components to the 
recommended CONOP product, which included as an appendix in this study. Chapter 
VIII includes a model that discusses the independent variables that affect CONOP 
approval delay across low, medium, and high-level risk CONOPs for Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Finally, chapter IX concludes the study with recommendations and final thoughts. 
                                                 
8 Concurrence to conduct the survey was required by the United States Army Special Forces 
Command (Airborne) in order to complete the administrative requirements at IRB. The survey was posted 
online to Sakai, a website that allows the user to design and administer the survey with fast and efficient 
results.   The survey was administered for twelve days and then the results were compiled. 
 6 
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II. SURVEY RESULTS 
If there is going to be a CONOP there needs to be one structured Format. 
Too many different officers on the way up the Chain decide that they want 
something else and kick back the CONOP for style reasons. If there was 
one structured format this would cut down on wasted time and man-hours 
of work by eliminating personal preference for a functional dictated 
format.9 
A. SURVEY 
1. Survey Design 
The survey was designed into specific sections regarding the CONOP procedure. 
Part one of the survey collects data regarding actions of the staff and SFODAs prior to 
CONOP submission. Part two of the survey asks questions regarding synchronization of 
CONOPs, staff oversight of CONOPs, and resource allocation of CONOPs. Part three 
covers areas regarding nesting of CONOPs, concurrence of CONOPs, and approval 
authority of CONOPs. The survey concludes with part four, the CONOP product. The 
majority of the questions in the survey were designed around a likert scale of one to ten, 
with a few exceptions of questions regarding the CONOP product and the qualitative data 
regarding the subjects. 
2. Survey Distribution 
The survey was posted to the Sakai platform at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
After receiving concurrence to conduct the survey from IRB, the United States Army 
Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC-A) Commander, and the Defense 
Analysis (DA) department at the Naval Postgraduate School, the hyperlink to the survey 
and a brief synopsis was forwarded back to USASFC(A). From there, the survey was 
disseminated to the Special Forces community. Additionally, an advertisement was 
posted to the home page of Army Knowledge Online (AKO) with a hyperlink to the 
survey. Subjects had approximately twelve days to participate in the survey. Following 
                                                 
9 Subject 86. Anonymous Sergeant First Class, Special Forces, 18D, OEF-P veteran (Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines), question 71.  
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the initial email of distribution for the survey, a reminder to participate in the survey was 
forwarded by USASFC(A) seven days later. On the twelfth day the survey closed and the 
data was exported to an Excel document using Sakai. Presently, only the primary and 
secondary persons conducting this study will have access to the data. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE SURVEY DATA 
1. Participation 
Approximately 150 subjects submitted results for the survey. Subjects who 
participated consisted of a balance of active duty officers, warrant officers, and non-
commissioned officers, with a small percentage of retirees. Subjects represented all of the 
military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the SF branch.  65% of the individuals that 
participated are captains, majors, warrants, and non-commissioned officers that are 
directly impacted by the CONOP procedure. Senior ranking non-commissioned officers 
that participated were sergeants major and command sergeants major. Senior warrant 
officers consisted of CW3 and CW4’s. The highest ranking officers that participated in 
the survey were lieutenant colonels. Senior ranking NCOs, warrants, and officers make 
up 21% of the subjects that participated. Figure 1 demonstrates the distribution of rank 




Figure 1.  Distribution of Rank and MOS. 
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2. Deployment Distribution 
The majority of subjects that participated in the survey stated Afghanistan as their 
most recent deployment. Iraq comes in second. A small percentage of the subjects that 
did not state Iraq or Afghanistan as their most recent deployment primarily deployed in 
support of joint combined exchange training (JCETs) in the Pacific or South America. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the deployment distribution of the subjects that participated in the 
survey.10 
 
Figure 2.  Most Recent Deployment Distribution. 
                                                 
10 Question 1 of the survey asked subjects where they deployed most recently; 102 of the total 
subjects that participated in the survey responded with Afghanistan, 36 of the subjects responded with a 
deployment to Iraq, and 12 of the subjects responded with “other.” 
 11 
III. THE CONOP AND CONOP PROCEDURE 
I hope tactical commander’s input will be taken into account in this 
survey. The entire CONOP process is broken and has become a burden on 
ODAs, has stripped authority (and consequentially legitimacy in the eyes 
of HN/FID partners) from ODA commanders, and is a huge time sink for 
staffs. The process and format of CONOPs are supreme, the mission they 
attempt to convey and gain approval for has become secondary.11 CW3, 
Special Forces Veteran. 
A. APPROVAL TIME FOR THE CONOP 
Time is a key factor when conducting operations. SFODAs are required to submit 
CONOPs for concurrence prior to the conduct of any operation. CONOPs that are 
delayed can postpone or even cancel operations. The data indicates significant differences 
between Iraq and Afghanistan and the average time it took for SFODAs to receive 
concurrence for their CONOP. Afghanistan and Iraq differed with how each theatre of 
operations labeled the CONOP. Table 1 shows how each level of CONOP was labeled. 
For the purpose of this study and in order to maintain simplicity, CONOPs are referred to 
as low-risk, medium-risk, or high-risk. 
                                                 
11 Subject number 65. Anonymous CW3, Special Forces, 180A, Afghanistan veteran, question 74. 
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Table 2.   Afghanistan and Iraq CONOPs. 
For the low-risk CONOP, typically characterized by a combat reconnaissance 
patrol, concurrence was received within about twelve hours in Afghanistan; however, 
SFODAs that conducted patrols in Iraq received approval in about six hours. Figure 3 
demonstrates the summary statistics of question 46.12  Note the mean, which is the 
average of the total samples taken from Iraq and Afghanistan.13  This data can be found 
in the descriptive statistics of Figure 3. Additionally, Figure 3 shows a visual 
representation of the data collected from the subjects on several histograms. 
                                                 
12 See Appendix C to see the survey questions. 
13 The mean, also known as the arithmetic mean, is the average or central measure. See Thomas H. 




Figure 3.  Question 46: Average Time for Approval for the Low-Risk CONOP. 
A histogram is a visual picture of bars that represent frequencies throughout the 
range.14   The data collected from Afghanistan demonstrates a bell curve shaped 
histogram. In short, the skew looks relatively even if a line were drawn over the bars. 
This clearly indicates the wide spectrum of approval times in Afghanistan. On the other 
hand, Iraq’s histogram is skewed right, with the majority of the values between one and 
three and the larger values, although fewer, bringing up the average slightly. This 
indicates that the approval times for low-risk CONOPs in Iraq were rapid and more 
standardized than the approval times for low-risk CONOPs in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
14 Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics,14. 
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Question 47 denotes the average time for concurrence for a medium-risk CONOP, 
which might requires rotary wing support and with some potential for political 
repercussion.15  Figure 4 shows the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 4.  Question 47: Average Time for Approval for the Medium-Risk CONOP. 
SFODAs that deployed to Afghanistan and submitted a medium-risk CONOP on 
average received approval within six to seven days. Approval was much more rapid for 
SFODAs that participated in Iraq; medium-risk CONOPs were approved within forty-
eight hours. Note the skew of both histograms.16   Iraq is heavily skewed to the right 
because there is almost no distribution of larger values. Afghanistan, although it is 
                                                 
15 See Appendix C to see the survey questions. 
16 Skew is the visual distribution of the peaks in a histogram. Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics,19. 
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skewed to the right, varies slightly more due a few more of the larger values. The larger 
values indicated by Afghanistan’s histogram will pull up the average time for approval. 
Approval times in Iraq were clearly rapid and more standardized while approval times in 
Afghanistan varied more. 
Question 48 denotes the average time for concurrence for a high-risk CONOP.17  
High-risk CONOPs, which are characterized as operations that are high-risk to the force, 
require rotary wing transport, with strong potential for political repercussion, take the 
longest to receive concurrence and receive the most scrutiny from high headquarters. 
 
Figure 5.  Question 48: Average Time for Approval for High-Risk CONOP. 
                                                 
17 See Appendix C to see the survey questions 
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Subjects that deployed to Afghanistan and submitted a high-risk CONOP received 
approval in less than two weeks; however, high-risk CONOPs that were submitted in Iraq 
received approval within three to five days. There are clear differences between the two 
histograms as well. Again, Iraq’s histogram has a strong right skew indicating rapid and 
more predictable approval times. Afghanistan’s histogram has a bi-modal shaped 
histogram demonstrated by the values to the left and to the right. This indicates approval 
times for high-risk CONOPs were unpredictable and more time consuming compared to 
Iraq’s approval times. 
The histograms for the low-risk, the medium-risk, and the high-risk CONOPs 
clearly indicate a pattern. First, detachments that served in Iraq could expect approval 
sooner. Given the skew of every histogram for Iraq for figures 3–5, the pattern was clear 
predictability for approval times. This is not the case for Afghanistan. Detachments that 
served in Afghanistan probably could not predict when they would receive approval 
given the skew of each histogram. The skew for Afghanistan varied too widely, proving 
that predictability of approval times was seriously in question. 
There are several possible explanations for this. First, a higher operation tempo 
(OPTEMPO) can force commanders and staff to approve CONOPs quicker. Although 
this is speculative, it does give some explanation. On the other hand, information 
requirements for the Iraq CONOPs were significantly less compared to Afghanistan. This 
indicates a more rapid staffing procedure and quicker approval times. A final explanation 
may point to the individual SOTF and CJSOTF commander. Different commanders have 
different standards for CONOPs, therefore changing procedures, standardization, and 
information requirements with each deployment. Evidence revealed in figures three 
through five demonstrates that Afghanistan had a higher standard deviation than Iraq. 
What this means is a higher standard deviation indicates that the commanders matter 
more in theater. Conversely, a lower standard deviation indicates that the commanders 
did not matter as much and remained relatively less involved with the CONOP product 
and the CONOP procedure. The question is why?  This might be explained by the 
relationship between the commander and the detachments. This theme is clarified further 
in the concluding chapter of this study.  
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Now let’s compare the differences between the information requirements for Iraq 
CONOPs and Afghanistan CONOPs. An anonymous Master Sergeant stated in the survey 
that… 
Principles should not be broken but information overload and providing all 
that information to a CONOP should NOT be the responsibility of the 
ODA....Team SG T is NOT an admin position but it is becoming one due 
to the current eye wash requirements.18 
This quote echoes the theme that SFODAs are currently burdened with the enormous 
amount of information requirements in the CONOP product. Figure 6 shows the average 
number of slides that were contained in a low-risk CONOP in Afghanistan and Iraq. Note 
the mean, which is shown in the descriptive statistics. 
                                                 
18 Subject 105. Anonymous Master Sergeant, Special Forces 18Z, Iraq veteran, question 71. 
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Figure 6.  Average Number of Slides in a Low-Risk CONOP. 
The average number of slides that were required in Afghanistan for a low-risk 
CONOP was about five slides. Iraq, on the other hand, had fewer slides with an average 
of about four slides. The histograms in Figure 6 show both Iraq and Afghanistan with a 
skew to the right. This demonstrates similar information requirements, although 
Afghanistan had slightly more information requirements for the low-risk CONOP. 
Figure 7 shows the average number of slides that were contained in a medium-
risk CONOP in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
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Figure 7.  Average Number of Slides in a Medium-Risk CONOP. 
Information requirements increase for Iraq and Afghanistan medium-risk 
CONOPs. Afghanistan’s CONOP information requirements, indicated by the average 
number of slides, are substantially higher than Iraq. The average number of slides for a 
medium-risk CONOP in Afghanistan was around fourteen slides. Iraq had fewer 
information requirements with an average of five slides. Skew is another indicator of the 
amount of information requirements required by the SOTF. Afghanistan’s histogram 
demonstrates skew heavily to the left because most of the values are high numbers. This 
shows that there was little indication that the information requirements for a medium-risk 
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CONOP ever dropped below the mean. Iraq, with a skew to the right, evens out as 
information requirements increase. This indicates that the mean varied from operation to 
operation and from detachment to detachment.   
Figure 8 shows the average number of slides that were required in a high-risk 
CONOP in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Figure 8.  Average Number of Slides in a High-Risk CONOP. 
Information requirements increase for Afghanistan and Iraq for the high-risk 
CONOP; however, there are substantially more slides required in Afghanistan. The 
average number of slides required in Afghanistan is between fifteen and seventeen slides. 
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The average number of slides required in Iraq was between five and six slides. The skew 
demonstrated on Afghanistan’s histogram indicates that the information requirements for 
high-risk CONOPs in Afghanistan remained relatively high and similar to the medium-
risk CONOP information requirements. Iraq’s histogram shows a right skew which evens 
out as information requirements increase. This indicates that the information 
requirements, indicated by the mean, vary once again in Iraq when compared to 
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, SOTF and CJSOTF commanders in Iraq did not require 
nearly the amount of information for a high-risk CONOP as SOTF commanders do in 
Afghanistan. 
Simple correlation was used to determine the amount of informational 
requirements for each level CONOP and the amount of time it takes for approval.19   
Afghanistan demonstrated strong correlation between these variables for low-risk, 
medium-risk, and high-risk CONOPs. Figure 9 demonstrates the relationships between 
the variables of information requirements and the time for approval in Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 9.  Afghanistan: Correlation between Q63–65 and 46–48. 
                                                 
19 Correlation coefficient measures the degree of linear association between two variables. Linear 
correlation coefficient is the quantity between -1 and +1. This quantity is denoted by R. The closer to R +1 
the stronger positive (direct) correlation and similarly the closer to R -1 the stronger (negative) inverse 
correlation exists between the two variables. See Larry D. Schroeder, David L. Sjoquist, and Paula E. 
Stephan, Understanding Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1986) 24–25. 
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Iraq demonstrated similar relationships between these same variables. Figure 10 
demonstrates the correlation between information requirements and approval times. 
 
Figure 10.  Iraq: Correlation between Q63–65 and Q46–48. 
The correlation for Afghanistan and Iraq between information requirements and 
approval time is strong. Indeed, the relationship demonstrates that the more informational 
demands we place on our detachments, the more time it takes for approval. As time 
increases for CONOP approval, operational agility can potentially decrease. 
 Approval time increases in proportion to the informational requirements for each 
level CONOP, yet SFODAs and SOTF staffs continue to submit CONOPs with the 
similar informational requirements and within the similar time windows. With that said, 
what exactly are the primary factors for CONOP delay?  These factors can be found in 
the informational requirements demanded upon the detachments. They are discussed in 
the following chapter. 
B. DELAYS TO CONOP APPROVAL 
1. The CONOP is a briefing tool not a planning tool.  2. The mission 
commander conducts detailed planning IOT meet the mission 
requirements not the CONOP requirements. We fail to maintain the 
initiative because we adjust missions to meet the CONOP process 
requirements. Commanders cannot react to the enemy, an attack or 
opportunity target, with a lengthy CONOP format and approval process. 
The enemy knows this weakness and exploits it.  3. There is no need to 
brief SOPs or common data in the CONOPs. The type of rifle each soldier 
is carrying is a waste of time and effort.  4. The CONOP should facilitate 
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operations and not become an obstacle.  5. Minimum slides is better. 6. 
Do not standardize a format. Each commander should tailor the CONOP 
to meet his unique environment and requirements.  –CW2, Special Forces 
Veteran.  
It is certain that almost every detachment has submitted a CONOP that did not 
receive immediate approval. With every CONOP that was returned to the detachment 
unapproved, man hours increase in order to staff and correct the product so that 
detachment may execute its mission. Some staff member will correct the deficiencies, 
whatever they may be, on the spot so that the detachment’s timeline for mission 
execution is not delayed. On the other hand, those who have served on staff and received 
numerous CONOPs with imperfections can become overwhelmed with the staffing 
process. These CONOP are normally returned to the detachment through the AOB in 
order to fix the errors. The mission now runs the risk of “sliding to the right,” which can 
also potentially cause assets to be reallocated to other operations. 
1. The Low-Risk CONOP 
The low-risk CONOP is primarily a combat reconnaissance patrol outside the fire 
base. These can be packaged into a power point presentation with a minimal amount of 
slides. Figure 11 demonstrates the primary factors for low-risk CONOP approval delay. 
These factors are broken down into a pie chart for quick visual reference. Below the pie 




Figure 11.  Low-risk CONOP Approval Delay. 
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Interestingly, formatting/packing of slides and incorrect font make up 22% of 
low-risk CONOP rejection. This begs for some standardization or simplification of the 
low-risk CONOP package. Additionally, poor doctrine, which is 23% of CONOP 
rejection, make majority of the chart of Figure 11. Resources and nesting make up 28% 
of CONOP delay. Finally, a small percentage stated that their CONOP was rejected 
because it exceeded the criteria of the low-risk (the detachment was submitting medium-
risk or a high-risk CONOP under a low-risk CONOP package) or the staff was inefficient 
and simply “sat” on the CONOP. These comments were taken from subjects who clicked 
“other.” 
2. The Medium-Risk CONOP 
The medium-risk CONOP is considered medium-risk to the force, typically 
requires rotary wing transport, with some potential for political repercussion. As the 
information requirements increase with each level of risk, the CONOP package becomes 
larger. The medium-risk CONOP takes considerable more time to prepare by the 
detachment and reviewed by the SOTF staff when compared to the low-risk CONOP. 




Figure 12.  Medium-risk CONOP Approval Delay. 
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Interestingly, format, packing, and font, which make up 16% of Level 1 CONOP 
delays, do not become the primary factors of rejection despite that information 
requirements increase, but they are still significant. Resources become the most 
significant factor for delays to medium-risk CONOPs. Detachments compete with each 
other and with other coalition forces across the AO when submitting medium-risk 
CONOPs, specifically CONOPs that require rotary wing and ISR assets. Resources make 
up 31% of the delays for medium-risk CONOP approval. The detachment’s use of 
doctrine in the CONOP is also worth mentioning here. Detachments submitting medium-
risk CONOPs for approval are delayed 16% of the time due to doctrinal infractions. 
3. The High-Risk CONOP 
The high-risk CONOP is considered high-risk to the force, usually requires rotary 
wing transport, with strong potential for political repercussion. These take considerable 
time to prepare by the detachment and staff at the SOTF. These CONOPs can be 
submitted to levels of approval beyond the CJSOTF as they can be politically sensitive. 
These operations, if they are not time sensitive, can be forecasted out for weeks due to the 
time it takes for approval.   
Figure 13 shows the primary factors for delays to the high-risk CONOP approval. 
Resource allocation is still a primary factor for high-risk CONOP approval delay. High-
risk CONOPs were delayed due to resources, specifically rotary wing and ISR, 28% of 
the time. Nesting and doctrine still make up a significant aspect of CONOP delay. Again, 
this begs for simplification and standardization of the CONOP product so that 





Figure 13.  High-risk CONOP Approval Delay. 
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C. CHANGING THE CONOP DURING DEPLOYMENTS 
For each deployment, the detachment can expect the format to change multiple 
times while in theatre and with each rotation. Figure 14 demonstrates the average number 
of times subjects reported the CONOP format changing while in theatre. 
 
Figure 14.  Number of Times the CONOP Format Changed While Deployed. 
The mean, or the average, for Afghanistan was 3.9, suggesting that the CONOP 
format changed nearly four times during a deployment. Iraq’s format, with a mean of 4.8, 
changed nearly five times. When the CONOP configuration changes as often as it does 
while Special Forces are deployed, delays can be expected for CONOP approval. The 
skew for Afghanistan and Iraq show an interesting range of the data. Afghanistan is 
skewed right. Iraq is quite close to a bi-modal distribution. It is worth mentioning, that 
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some detachments indicated that the format changed more than nine times in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. 
The data in Figure 11 and Figure 12 state that formatting and packing of slides 
were significant factors to CONOP approval delay. Constant changes to the CONOP 
format not only delay approval, but make familiarization and teaching the CONOP 
methodology prior to deployments challenging. Battalions conducting pre-mission 
training deployments will undoubtedly have their detachment submit CONOPs to the 
staff as part of the training. Yet, these CONOPs will not be the same product the battalion 
will see when they deploy. Standardization and simplification of the CONOP will 
decrease approval time for the detachments and shorten the man hours for the preparation 
for each CONOP and the staffing process during the CONOP procedure. 
D. CONOP APPROVAL AUTHORITY 
The purpose of a CONOP is NOT to provide a detailed, tactical plan to 
operational and strategic leadership...yet this is what we have been using 
CONOPs to accomplish. When a Three-Star Commander asks “How many 
men on this ODA have their Ranger tabs?” we have completely lost sight 
of what we are using this process for. CONOPs should be used to permit 
these headquarters to assess the operational/strategic impacts (and risks) 
of these operations and determine whether or not the potential gains offset 
the potential risks.20 
The general trend for CONOP approval according to the survey is that approval 
authority should drop one level down. Despite support for delegating approval authority 
to lower levels, most of the subjects caveated with the CONOP submitted to higher for 
situational awareness. 
Indeed, as commanders assume more risk during operations, the higher the level 
of scrutiny over the CONOP product and the detachments. Prior to any AOB, SOTF, or 
CJSOTF commander’s approval, the staff at each particular level will dissect the CONOP 
before it goes in front of the commander for approval. Additionally, high-risk CONOPs 
will go beyond the CJSOTF level and potentially up to the theatre commander for 
approval. During the CONOP staffing process, errors will be corrected, resources will be 
                                                 
20 Subject 43. Anonymous Major, Special Forces, 18A, Iraq veteran, question 74. 
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secured, and deconfliction and synchronization will be verified. Throughout all of the 
staffing process, time once again becomes the critical factor. In general, the higher the 
level of approval authority, the longer it takes for a CONOP to receive approval from the 
commander. 
The low-risk CONOP, those low-risk operations, is typically the combat 
reconnaissance patrols outside the fire base. In order to conduct any patrol, the 
detachment submits a power point slide of his CONOP at least twenty-four to forty-eight 
hours prior to his departure time. The detachment must wait to depart until he receives 
concurrence from his higher HQ. The overwhelming majority of the subjects stated that 
the detachment commander should have approval authority of low-risk CONOPs. Figure 
15 shows the level of support for approval authority for the low-risk, medium-risk and 
the high-risk CONOP. For the low-risk CONOP, 43% of the subjects support the 
detachment commander to approve his own patrols while 34% support approval authority 
under the AOB commander.   
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Figure 15.  CONOP Approval Authority for the Low-Risk, Medium-Risk, and High-Risk 
CONOPs. 
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Summary statistics demonstrated that the approval authority was quite close 
between the AOB commander and SOTF Commander for approval of the medium-risk 
CONOP and between the SOTF Commander and CJSOTF Commander for approval of 
the high-risk CONOP. Nevertheless, approval authority for the medium-risk CONOP 
increases one level up from the detachment commander with 38% of the subjects in 
support of the AOB commander. Finally, 36% of the subjects stated the Battalion 
Commander should have approval authority over the high-risk CONOP. 
Delays to CONOP approval occur when informational requirements increase, 
when formats change during deployments, and when approval authority increases. In 
order to decrease approval time and increase agility of our detachments, decrease the 
amount of informational requirements for the CONOP, simplify the CONOP format, and 
delegate approval authority to lower levels. 
E. RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND STAFF OVERSIGHT DURING THE 
CONOP SEQUENCE 
The geography of Afghanistan and the nature of the threat drive the tactics against 
coalition forces. This relationship has increased the competiveness between coalition 
forces for rotary wing support and ISR platforms in order to bypass the terrain advantage 
and IED threat which favors the enemy. In order to remain competitive for these assets, 
the SOTF must have effective oversight of SFODA operations prior to the CONOP 
sequence. 
According the data collected from the survey, the general trend across Special 
Forces is that SFODAs are not planning for operations more than one week in advance. 
Figure 16 demonstrates the descriptive statistics and histograms for Afghanistan and Iraq 
for question 28.21 
                                                 
21 See Appendix C for the survey questions 
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Figure 16.  Question 28 SFODA Forecasting and Planning Prior to CONOP Submission. 
The mean for Afghanistan states that SFODAs are planning operations at least 
four to five days prior to CONOP submission. SOFDAs in Iraq were planning within a 
much tighter window of about three days prior to CONOP submission. The skew for Iraq 
is heavily to the right, indicating that planning windows varied little, possibly due to 
OPTEMPO. Afghanistan’s histogram has a near bell shaped curve. This is indicated by 
the height of the data, which is mostly in the middle, and tapering off in both directions. 
This indicates that planning varied widely in Afghanistan, possibly due to a slower 
OPTEMPO. 
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The SOTF staff is not forecasting operations very far out either. Despite robust 
targeting procedures across Special Forces, the data from question 30 indicates that the 
staff was not requesting operational information or resource requirements from the 
detachments more than seven days out. 
 
Figure 17.  Question 30: Resource and Operational Requirements by the SOTF Staff Prior 
to CONOP Submission. 
Figure 17 shows the mean for Afghanistan as 5.1. This indicates that the staff 
wanted to know what the detachment was planning, including the required resources at 
least six to seven days prior to CONOP submission. The time was relatively shorter in 
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Iraq, with a mean of 4.7, which indicated the staff wanted operational information and 
resource requirements about five days out. Although the staff and detachments were 
trying to forecast resources for future operations, the staff could not have had a clear 
picture of the operation and therefore little justification of resources without the CONOP. 
The histograms for both Iraq and Afghanistan indicate a bi-modal distribution of the data. 
This means that some SOTF staffs required resource and operational requirements more 
than other SOTF staffs.   
Given the lack of lengthy forecasting of operations in Special Forces, the staff and 
the SFODAs cannot effectively compete with other conventional forces for non-organic 
resources to support operations. Indeed, the staff generally did not initiate coordination 
for resources until the CONOP was submitted by the detachment to the SOTF. 
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Figure 18.  Question 35: Coordinations for Assets Submitted with the CONOP to the 
Battalion Staff. 
Figure 18 shows the mean, or the average, of the subjects that stated coordination 
for assets was submitted along with the CONOP. According to the data, subjects in Iraq 
and Afghanistan stated that the coordination for resources was submitted to the SOTF in 
conjunction with the CONOP more than half the time. The skew is to the left for both 
Afghanistan and Iraq which indicates the pattern across Special Forces is to coordinate 
for resources when the CONOP is submitted for approval. 
From here, the data was analyzed using correlation between questions 34 and 35. 
Question 34 asked whether the detachments CONOPs were “pushed to the right” as a 
result of the scarcity of ISR and rotary wing assets.   
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Figure 19.  Question 34: CONOPs “Pushed to the Right” Due to Scarcity of Resources. 
Figure 19 shows that most of the SFODAs stated that their CONOPs were 
postponed about half of the time as a result of resource requirements. The skew for 
Afghanistan has a symmetrical bell-curved shape, which indicates most of the subjects 
experienced delays to their CONOPs due to resources. Iraq has more of a bi-modal shape 
due to two main columns on the histogram. This indicates few subjects experienced 
CONOP delays due to resources or a lot of subjects experienced CONOP delays due to 
resource. Now that question 34 and 35 are fully understood, correlation was used to 
analyze the relationships between the variables. Again, question 35 asked subjects if the 
coordinations for resources were submitted by the SFODA when the CONOP was 
submitted for approval. To simplify the variables, they are CONOP approval delay and 
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resource coordinations submitted in conjunction with the CONOP. There was a 
significant relationship. Figure 20 shows the correlation: 
 
Figure 20.  Correlation Between Resource Coordination During the CONOP Procedure 
and CONOP Delay. 
Afghanistan demonstrated a correlation of .63 and Iraq demonstrated a correlation 
of .84. Both theatres of operations show a significant relationship between the two 
variables. What this correlation means is that in order to increase competitiveness for 
resources, the SOTF must increase its oversight during a targeting procedure rather than 
the CONOP procedure.  
Effective staff oversight for resource requirements begins with a targeting 
methodology rather than the CONOP sequence. Figure 21 demonstrates a timeline for a 
typical CONOP developed by an SFODA and submitted to the SOTF for approval. The 
SFODA begins with CONOP development and submits the CONOP to the AOB. Next, 
the AOB submits the CONOP to the SOTF in order to gain approval for the operation. 
Once the CONOP is received at the SOTF, it is during this timeframe that the staff has 
effective management over the required resources for the SFODAs future operation. 
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Figure 21.  Staff Management of Resources during the CONOP Sequence. 
As the SFODA develops the CONOP, the SOTF has little to no direct oversight of 
the resources required for the operation. If the SFODA submits the requests for assets 
prior to CONOP submission, the staff has little understanding of operation and will have 
difficulty obtaining non-organic assets to support the operation. This is “lost time” and is 
demonstrated in the diagram above with the red brackets.   
A targeting methodology by the SOTF staff provides effective management of 
organic and non-organic resources required to support operations across the SOTF. A 
simple targeting slide, developed by the SOTF staff and filled out by the SFODA, will 
accelerate the CONOP sequence and increase the SOTF’s competitiveness for non-
organic assets across the area of operations. Figure 22 demonstrates the targeting 
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sequence to drive the CONOP process and make up for the “lost time” as a result of the 
CONOP methodology. 
 
Figure 22.  Making up for Lost Time. 
The targeting methodology will increase staff oversight for the resources required 
to support operations. Indeed, the SOTF competes for non-organic assets like any other 
adjacent unit in the area of operations. In order to increase competitiveness, the SOTF 
staff requires management and oversight of resource requirements long before the 
CONOP is ever submitted to the SOTF for approval. To this end, the SOTF requires a 
targeting methodology that will drive CONOP production. For a more detailed method of 
the targeting methodology, see Annex B. 
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IV. CODIFYING THE CONOP PROCEDURE 
Keep it simple, stupid.22 
Indeed, the words expressed by this Non-Commissioned officer echo the 
sentiment of many of our Special Forces operators. Information requirements demanded 
from the detachments have increased to proportions where agility and momentum can be 
degraded. Adding to information demands are the constant changes to the CONOP 
format, which can delay CONOP approval, potentially pushing back the timeline to the 
detachments operations. The result is a CONOP that flows back and forth between the 
staff and the detachments until corrections are perfected so it can receive approval from 
the commander.   Additionally, the CONOP can “sit” with the staff or is kicked back to 
the detachment until another window appears for execution if the delay causes resources 
to be reallocated.  
Strong support exists across the Special Forces community, as much as 57%, for 
doctrinalization of the CONOP. Figure 23 represents the number of subjects that 
supported putting the CONOP into doctrine. 
                                                 
22 Subject 32. Anonymous Sergeant First Class, 18F, Afghanistan veteran, question 71. 
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Figure 23.  Question 71: Putting the CONOP into Doctrine. 
Conversely, 25% of subjects did not support putting the CONOP into doctrine. 
Several points in the counter argument are worth mentioning here. Some of the subjects 
stated that different areas of responsibility (AORs) have different commands and 
different requirements. For example, Karzai’s 12 points became a relevant additional 
slide for the medium-risk and high-risk CONOPs in Afghanistan. The premises are valid, 
but this counter argument is unsound. CONOPs that contained Karzai’s 12 points were 
never delayed because of this particular slide. The CONOPs were delayed due to their 
content, doctrine, packaging, and resourcing. All CONOPs will contain doctrine to 
demonstrate to the commander the effects that will be achieved. The CONOP format is 
only the method of packaging the presentation, yet if this format is not standardized, as 
was demonstrated in chapter III, detachments can anticipate delay to CONOP approval. 
Commands and AORs may have different requirements, but doctrine is the method for 
standardization and telling the story to the commander exactly how the mission will be 
accomplished. Standardization of the CONOP format will allow familiarization of its 
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structure prior to deploying and decrease delays to approval while deployed. The 
information that a commander requires to make a decision for approval can be 
standardized and formatted. Karzai’s 12 points can be a simple addition to the CONOP 
package once detachments are deployed into theatre. 
Other subjects that oppose doctrinalization of the CONOP stated that the unit 
should set its own standard operating procedure (SOP) for the CONOP format. This 
would be good, except for the AOBs and detachments that deploy attached to other 
SOTFs, who may have a different standard. Again, this would require the detachments to 
re-familiarize themselves with the new format. Again, as discussed in chapter III, 
formatting and packing of slides was a significant issue and often resulted in delays to 
CONOP approval. Support for implementing the CONOP into doctrine is strong in the SF 
community, but when do we need to implement the CONOP procedure?   
Knowing when to implement the CONOP is as important as codifying the 
CONOP product and procedure. Indeed, it is common knowledge that Special Forces did 
not have CONOPs in the early days of Afghanistan or Iraq. As coalition forces entered 
into theatre and competition for resources increased, commanders demanded more 
information from their detachments to justify operations. Figure 24 demonstrates the 
primary conditions for implementing the CONOP procedure. 
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Figure 24.  Question 62: Implementing the CONOP Procedure. 
Conducting direct action raids and integration with coalition and host nation 
forces have made over 40% of the conditions for implementing the CONOP procedure. 
Although the scope of the survey limited the choices to the subjects, many of the subjects 
indicated with commentary throughout the survey that resources and level of risk were 
also major factors for implementing the CONOP. 
Competition for resources, level of risk, and integration with coalition and host 
nation forces are the primary factors driving CONOP production. When these conditions 
are present in theatre, the commander should decide to implement the CONOP. The 
decision should be made by the commander and will be based on the conditions present 
in the AO. 
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V. THE RECOMMENDED CONOP FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS 
IN SPECIAL FORCES BATTALIONS 
The CONOP process is good but takes too long and requires too much 
effort in most circumstances. The 5Ws is very quick to get out the wire and 
focus on more important things other than providing a cute little package 
to reference. Frequencies and MEDEVAC etc., should be standard across 
the board for must missions. Level I & II CONOPs is slightly different as 
the danger level and more complicated missions. But there is a lot of fluff 
in CONOPs that isn’t needed. At least cut the package down slightly. Too 
much time is spent in front of computers these days.23 
Standardization is essential for the CONOP in order to maintain familiarity with 
the product and decrease time for concurrence. This study recommends a standard 
CONOP which contains relevant information the commander requires to make a decision 
for approval. The survey asked subjects to choose the relevant components for the 
CONOP product if it were to be implemented into doctrine. Figure 25 shows the 
comprehensive list of components for questions 72 and 73 of the survey and the number 
of times that particular component was chosen by the subjects. 
                                                 




Figure 25.  Question 72 and 73: The Minimum Components for the CONOP Product. 
A. THE MAJOR COMPONENTS TO THE CONOP 
Several components were strongly supported by the subjects. Task organization, 
MEDEVAC, Timeline, SFODA commander’s mission, Concept of the operation (1 
slide), and Frequencies all had over one hundred subjects who support including this 
information into the CONOP structure. These components should be mandatory for all 
CONOPs in order for the commander to make a decision to concur with the operation. 
B. SUBCOMPONENTS TO THE CONOP 
Subcomponents to the CONOP were Terrain Orientation (AO/AI), composition 
and disposition of the threat, SFODA commander intent, SFODA course of action 
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statement, SFODA purpose and form of maneuver, SFODA decisive point and why, 
SFODA endstate, SFODA scheme of maneuver (1 slide per phase), and graphic fire 
control measures (GFCs). Most of these components are quite simple and only enhance 
the commander’s knowledge of the operation. 
C. OTHER COMPONENTS TO THE CONOP 
Although most of these components could be dropped, not all of them have to be 
eliminated from the recommended CONOP structure. Civil considerations, for example, 
did not have strong support to be included in the CONOP structure; however, given its 
importance it is already doctrinally included in the SFODA commander’s endstate. Civil 
considerations do not require a separate slide. Rather, it is sufficient to keep it in the 
endstate and discuss it as required under the scheme of maneuver. Other components, 
such as the SFODA task and purpose and the enemy elements task and purpose did not 
receive strong support as well; however, these components can be included due to 
stronger support for the friendly scheme of maneuver and composition and disposition of 
the threat. 
D. THE RECOMMENDED CONOP PRODUCT 
Appendix A is the recommended CONOP. The recommendation is a compromise 
between objectivity from the data taken from this study and subjectivity based on 
personal knowledge of the CONOP procedure. The format was adopted from the data 
taken from the survey, a recent high-risk CONOP taken from Afghanistan, and an 
operations order (OPORD) grade sheet from the Maneuver Captains Career Course 
(MCCC). The CONOP design is close to the current CONOP in Afghanistan, but with 
significantly less information requirements, since this operation is still ongoing. This 
study recommends a cover slide, a concept of the operation slide and a signal slide as 
mandatory components for the CONOP structure. A scheme of maneuver slide, by phase, 
is optional for the commander. This slide, if included, will increase the commander’s 
knowledge of the detachment’s plan, but will also potentially hinder approval time. 
MEDEVAC is mandatory and must be included in the scheme of maneuver, by phase of 
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the operation. If the scheme of maneuver is eliminated, MEDEVAC must be included in 
the concept of the operations slide. 
The recommended CONOP is the maximum amount of information that 
commander should require in order to understand the operation and a justification for 
approval. It is not recommended to add any more slides or other information 
requirements that could burden the detachments and staff. Indeed, the example provided 
can be simplified if the conditions in the AO or commander require it. In other words, 
given that this example is the maximum requirement, commanders and staff can 
eliminate slides in order to simplify their version in their AO. 
There were a small percentage of subjects who added components not listed to the 
choices in the survey. A gridded reference graphic (GRG) is definitely worth mentioning 
here. This can be a critical component for deconfliction and battle tracking on the 
objective; however, it should be included as a document generated by the detachment 
upon CONOP approval, but not necessarily as a document to be included in the CONOP 
product when submitted for approval. Other comments in the survey advocated for 
including weather and terrain analysis. These components can be left out since the 
detachment conducts its own terrain and weather analysis prior to CONOP submission. 
The battalion does not need to know the effects of weather and terrain or products such as 
a modified combined obstacle overlay in order to concur with the detachment’s 
operation. The effects of weather and terrain on the detachment’s maneuver will be 
clearly evident in the detachment’s description of the concept of the operation or a 
scheme of maneuver. 
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VI. THE MODEL 
Same issues with SOTF on the LVL 1 as the two LVL 0 CONOP’s. LVL 1 
ended up never getting approved due to repeated change to execution 
dates from lack of support from higher. Air assets continued to get pushed 
right again and again. CONOP was initially a 5W, SOTF elevated it to a 
LVL 0 and had the ODA resubmit. Detachment CDR did a face to face 
with everyone envolved at SOTF and brought everyone on the same page. 
Days later during a VTC the Detachment CDR got thrown under the bus 
by all those he did a face to face with at SOTF before the SOTF CDR 
which resulted in it being elevated once again to a LVL 1. CONOP ended 
up never getting approved because ODA lost the timely opportunity due to 
the disconnect at SOTF.24 Sergeant First Class, Special Forces Veteran. 
A. DESIGNING THE MODEL 
The summary statistics and correlation within this study thus far demonstrated 
that there are numerous problems with the CONOP product and the CONOP procedure, 
but what are the major factors that contribute to CONOP delay?  That is the focus of this 
chapter. In order to understand the model that is presented in this chapter, it is equally 
important to understand how the survey supported and helped formulate the variables that 
contributed to CONOP delay. The questionnaire used in this study was designed to 
examine what affects CONOP delay. The questions were categorized into four parts, 
according to the survey structure.   
The survey itself included quantitative and qualitative sections. The quantitative 
questions of the survey comprised the majority of the study and sought to explore 
CONOP inputs that affected timely CONOP approval. The qualitative portions of the 
survey, which allowed subjects to comment on various questions in open blocks, focused 
on CONOP inputs and allowed subjects to provide additional information that may have 
been omitted in the survey. 
For the purpose of the quantitative portion, descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis were used to examine the variables hypothesized that contribute to CONOP 
                                                 
24 Subject 100. Anonymous Sergeant First Class, Special Forces, 18E, Afghanistan veteran, question 
50. 
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delay.25  In order to understand how the independent variables, or the inputs, and the 
dependent variables, the output, were formulated, it is important to understand the 
structure of the survey itself.   
 
Figure 26.  Formulating the Model. 
Figure 26 demonstrates how the survey was categorized. The diagram shows the 
methodology of not only formulating the independent variables, but the dependent 
variable as a result of these inputs. To sum their relationships, the model hypothesizes 
that CONOP approval time is dependent on the amount of staff feedback to the SFODAs 
during the CONOP procedure, the adaptability of the SFODA to the CONOP procedure 
                                                 
25 Given that the direction of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables were unknown, a two-tail hypothesis test was conducted for this model.  The data was input to 
Stata, an integrated statistical analysis software package. 
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and lack of resources to support the operation, the scarcity of resources, nesting, staff 
oversight of resources, and the amount of information requirements for the CONOP 
product. The proportion of CONOP approval delay is hypothesized to be affected by the 
inputs of these values.26 
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Now that the relationships have been discussed, statistical analysis is conducted to 
examine the CONOP procedure. Stated in simple terms, the hypothesis is that CONOP 
approval is greatly affected by the following independent variables. 
CONOP Approval = Staff Feedback + Adaptation + Resource Scarcity + Nesting 
+ Staff Oversight of Resources + Information Requirements 
Changes in any of these variables will either increase approval time for CONOPs 
or delay approval time for CONOPs. Using a multivariate regression model, we examine 
which variables affect CONOP delay more than others. Nine models are examined in this 
chapter regarding low-risk, medium-risk, and high-risk CONOPs: Iraq and Afghanistan 
combined, Afghanistan only, and Iraq only. A close examination of the coefficients and T 
values of the independent variables in the model above prove that they greatly affect 
timely CONOP approval.27 
As stated above, the independent variables will either increase or decrease 
approval times for CONOPs. To sum their relationships, staff feedback will increase 
approval times if the staff is slow to integrate with the SFODAs and AOBs. SFODA 
adaptation slows CONOP approval times if detachments are reacting to constant 
formatting changes to the CONOP and resource scarcities to support the operation. 
Resource scarcity will slow CONOP approval times, forcing the staff and SFODAs to 
come up with alternative resources to support the operation. Conversely, if resources are 
                                                 
26 This study utilized multiple linear regression analysis.  When several factors simultaneously affect 
one dependent variable multiple regression analysis is the method to use for measuring the effects of these 
factors concurrently.  Schroeder, Understanding Regression Analysis, 29. 
27The T value is a useful tool for examining the behavior of a model.  A high T-value associated with 
the parameter estimate tends to indicate that the estimate is well determined in the model; conversely, a low 
T-value tends to indicate that the estimate is poorly determined.  David A. Ratkowsky, Nonlinear 
Regression Modeling: A Unified Practical Approach, (New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, INC, 1983), 33. 
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available or if the operation does not require specific resources, this variable increases 
approval times. Nesting will increase CONOP approval because it demonstrates to the 
commander how the operation supports his intent. Staff oversight of resources will 
increase approval times, provided that the staff is aggressive with its oversight of 
resources, specifically rotary wing and ISR, prior to CONOP submission. Finally, 
information requirements slow CONOP approval times due to the higher volume of 
informational inputs required by the SFODA to the CONOP product. 
1. Afghanistan and Iraq 
Each table demonstrates how the independent variables affect approval for the 
low-risk, medium-risk, and high-risk CONOPs. This study utilized multiple regression 
analysis to examine the simultaneous effects of the independent variables on CONOP 
delay. Figure 27 demonstrates the effect of scarcity of assets and information 
requirements on low-risk CONOP approval.    
 
Figure 27.  Low-risk, Medium-risk, and High-risk CONOPs: Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Of the six independent variables listed above, scarcities of assets and information 
requirements have the strongest potential to affect low-risk CONOP approval.   
The coefficient for scarcity of assets is -.227. What this means is whenever a 
subject answers question 46 of the survey and the mean moves one unit left or right, 
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scarcity, an independent variable, changes the value of the dependent variable, CONOP 
approval, by -.227.28  A negative coefficient demonstrates that it shortens CONOP delay. 
In other words, scarcity of resources speeds up the CONOP procedure for low risk 
operations. This makes perfect sense for low risk operations since they rarely require any 
scarce resources, specifically rotary wing and ISR. Conversely, a positive coefficient will 
adversely affect CONOP approval time, increasing the time for approval. The coefficient 
for information requirements is .429.29  What this means is whenever the mean of 
question 46 moves from the left to the right one unit, information requirements, an 
independent variable, moves the dependent variable, CONOP approval, by .429. The 
coefficient is positive, which indicates the information requirements on low-risk 
operations slow the CONOP procedure and increase the time for approval. 
The T values are also worth noting on Figure 27. The T value for scarcity is -1.16 
and information requirements are 2.78. When evaluating the T values, the closer the 
value is to 0, the stronger is the evidence against the null hypothesis, the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. On the other hand, the stronger the 
evidence is that the T value is different from zero, the more reliable and precise the 
coefficient.30  Overall, low-risk CONOPs are most significantly delayed by information 
requirements while scarcity of assets is less statistically precise. 
The most significant effects on approval time changes as the CONOP increases to 
the medium-risk CONOP. Figure 27 shows the relationships of the independent variables 
to the dependent variable. Notice that staff feedback to the SFODAs and resource 
requirements have the most impact CONOP approval. Staff feedback, .291, has a positive 
coefficient, which indicates that it has potential to slow down the CONOP procedure. 
This might be explained by the level of approval authority and the scrutiny placed on the 
CONOP product as the level of approval authority increases. The staff must be in 
constant contact with the AOBs and SFODAs during the staffing process as the level of 
                                                 
28 Question 46 asked subjects the average time it takes for approval of a Low-risk CONOP. 
29 The regression coefficient is highly informative since it indicates by how much the dependent 
variable changes as the independent variable changes.  Schroeder, Understanding Regression Analysis, 29.  
30 T stats are stated in absolute value terms.  Schroeder, Understanding Regression Analysis, 48. 
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approval authority goes up. The slower the staff feedback is to the detachments, the 
longer the delay to CONOP approval. Once we go up one level, another interesting 
change occurs with the medium-risk CONOP. The data indicates that staff oversight of 
resources matter a lot more during the CONOP procedure. The coefficient for staff 
oversight, -.261, is negative. This indicates that staff with aggressive oversight of non-
organic resources will increase approval times versus a staff that does not have oversight 
of non-organic assets until CONOP submission. Information requirements are significant 
in the medium-risk CONOP, but not as much as with the low-risk CONOP. Furthermore, 
given that the T values of each of these independent variables are greater than two, both 
variables are strong predictors of the medium-risk CONOP. 
We see similar relationships in the high-risk CONOP in Figure 27. Again, staff 
feedback to the SFODAs and staff oversight of non-organic assets, specifically rotary 
wing and ISR, have significant impact on CONOP approval. It is same story with the 
high-risk as with the medium-risk; the higher the approval authority, the sooner the SOTF 
staff needs to exercise oversight over the CONOP. As we increase the level of CONOP 
risk, we need more staff oversight to decrease the impact of information requirements and 
scarcity of assets. Now that Afghanistan and Iraq CONOPs have been evaluated together, 
let us review Afghanistan specifically. 
2. Afghanistan 
The story changes in Afghanistan with the low-risk CONOP. Figure 28 
demonstrates that SFODA adaptability and low-risk CONOP information requirements 
have the most effect on CONOP approval.   
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Figure 28.  Low-risk, Medium-risk, and High-risk CONOPs: Afghanistan. 
SFODA adaptability with the CONOP procedure is simply the detachments 
ability to achieve approval despite resource requirements and information requirements to 
the CONOP. The coefficient for adaptability is .340, which indicates the more frequently 
they are forced to adapt to the battalion’s operational needs, the longer the delay. 
SFODAs that submitted CONOPs in Afghanistan spent more time adapting to CONOP 
procedures and formatting, which distracted the detachments from their other operational 
activities. The adaptability coefficient could also mean slower feedback to the SFODAs 
at the battalion and group levels. As stated in chapter IV, formatting and packing of slides 
combined with doctrine were major factors contributing to CONOP delay. Informational 
requirements, with a coefficient of .603, demonstrate it drastically slowed the CONOP 
approval times. The T values also demonstrate that adaptability and information 
requirements are the most significant predictors of CONOP delay in the low-risk 
CONOP. 
As the level of risk increases, the independent variables and their effect on the 
dependent variable change. Scarcities of assets and information requirements have the 
most effect on CONOP approval with the medium-risk CONOP. These variables are 
demonstrated in Figure 28. Scarcities of assets, with a coefficient of -.363, indicate that 
this variable increases approval times, provided that these assets are available. CONOP 
approval time increases as the level of risk goes higher. The coefficient for information 
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requirements is .329, indicating it slows down the CONOP procedure. The T values for 
scarcity and information requirements demonstrate these variables are significant and 
show that they are strong predictors for CONOP delay. 
The story changes a little in Afghanistan with the high-risk CONOP. Figure 28 
shows the impact of scarcity of assets and staff oversight of resources on high-risk 
CONOP approval. The coefficients for these variables are quite strong and they are both 
negative. Additionally, the T values show that both variables are strong and reliable 
predictors of CONOP delay. Indeed, staff oversight of resources becomes the major 
factor with the high-risk CONOP, quite a change from the medium-risk CONOP. 
Additionally, information requirements do impact the high-risk CONOP as much as the 
medium-risk, which is shown in Figure 28. This can be explained by the level of scrutiny 
and management over the high-risk CONOP. The higher the level of approval, the more 
attention the CONOP receives. Now that Afghanistan has been analyzed, this study will 
review Iraq specifically and compare the variables to Afghanistan. 
3. Iraq 
The numbers represented in the next figure for Iraq tell a much different story 
when compared to Afghanistan. Figure 29 shows how the independent variables nesting 
and staff oversight of resources impact approval time for the low-risk CONOP. 
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Figure 29.  Low-risk, Medium-risk, and High-risk CONOPs: Iraq. 
The coefficient for nesting is -.406 which indicates it decreases approval times. In 
other words, the more frequently the CONOP is nested, the more quickly it was 
approved. The coefficient for staff oversight is -.562 and also increased approval times 
for CONOPs in Iraq. Interestingly, adaptability and information requirements were the 
most significant factors contributing to delay in CONOP approval in Afghanistan (Figure 
28). Detachments that served in Afghanistan spent more time revising CONOPs and 
adapting to CONOP procedures when compared to Iraq. Detachments serving in Iraq that 
submitted low-risk CONOPs were delayed if their CONOPs were not nested or if the 
staff failed to have effective oversight of resource requirements to enable the 
detachments. This can also be explained by the number of slides required in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which was demonstrated in Figure 6 (Chapter III), and show why Iraq and 
Afghanistan have different independent variables. Simply put, Iraq had fewer information 
requirements on their detachments when compared to Afghanistan.   
We see an increase in staff feedback and staff oversight of resources when the 
level increases to the medium-risk CONOP. Figure 29 demonstrates the impact these 
independent variables have on CONOP approval. It is interesting to compare Figure 28 
with Figure 29 and see the differences in the independent variables between Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Staff oversight, with a coefficient of -.301, had the most effect on the 
CONOP procedure, decreasing the time in the approval process for SFODAs serving in 
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Iraq. Staff feedback has a coefficient of .253 and decreased approval times. This can be 
explained by the increase in information requirements which required more time for 
integration between the staff and the SFODAs to gain approval. On the other hand, 
Afghanistan’s approval time increases with the availability of resources, specifically 
rotary wing and ISR when compared to Iraq. Additionally, information requirements 
affected the CONOP approval process more in Afghanistan when compared to Iraq. 
Moving along to the high-risk CONOP, Figure 29 shows a change in the 
independent variables. Staff feedback remains the same (as with the medium-risk 
CONOP), but staff oversight of resources changes to information requirements. Once 
again, as shown in Figure 29, both coefficients are positive for staff feedback and 
information requirements, which indicate they slowed down CONOP approval times in 
Iraq. This change can be explained by the higher level of approval authority in order to 
justify approval for a high-risk operation and the time to collaborate between the staff, 
the SFODA, and the AOB. We also see the T values are significant as well, especially for 
staff feedback, which is 3.16. More than Afghanistan, staff feedback in Iraq had the most 
profound effect on CONOP approval. This concludes regression analysis for the 
Afghanistan and Iraq CONOPs. With these variables in mind we can build a model that 
can predict timely approval or delay for CONOPs. The next section sets the equation for 
a multiple regression model. 
C. DISCUSSION 
Regression analysis highlights what affects CONOP delay at different levels 
between Afghanistan and Iraq. The key findings from this analysis span from the 
detachment, to the SOTF to the CJSOTF level and beyond. Each variable varies in 
importance to the CONOP procedure, either delaying or hindering CONOP approval. At 
the detachment level, the most important factors are adaptability, nesting, and the 
detachment’s inputs to the information requirements of the CONOP. These are variables 
that the detachment can control. On the other hand, at the SOTF staff level, the important 
factors are staff feedback, visibility over resource requirements, and information 
requirements. Again, these are variables that the staff can control as well. The last 
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independent variable, scarcity or resources, are often driven by competition between 
detachments within the SOTF and between the SOTF and conventional forces. This is a 
variable that the SOTF often cannot always control. This depends on the amount of 
SOFDAs serving in theater and the number of organic resources attached to the SOTF, 
specifically rotary wing and ISR, which can support operations across the AO. Since 
these resources are major contributors to CONOP delay, the there is a strong argument 
here for an increase in these assets for Special Forces battalions. 
Although resources are a major contributor to CONOP delay, this technical factor 
can be overcome by increasing the staff’s oversight of resource requirements during a 
targeting procedure rather than the CONOP procedure. Nevertheless, whether the SOTF 
will ever enjoy an increase of rotary wing assets and ISR remains in question, but the 
CONOP procedure can still be enhanced by improvements to the human contributions to 
CONOP delay. More systematic feedback by the SOTF staff to the SFODAs and AOBs, 
decreasing information requirements, and standardizing the CONOP product are 
excellent steps to decrease delay to approval. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis recommends the following changes to the CONOP product and the 
CONOP procedure currently utilized by SOTFs: 
1. Replace the low-risk and medium-risk CONOP with the 5W format (Who, 
What, When, Where, Why).31 Retain the high-risk CONOP for operations that require 
high-demand resources, have strong potential for political repercussions, and present high 
risk to the force. Medium-risk CONOPs can be prepared for the SOTF commander if 
there is especially keen competition for resources. Use the format recommended in this 
study for the medium-risk and high-risk CONOPs. 
2. Assign approval authority for the 5W format to the detachment 
commander. Medium-risk CONOPs can be approved by the AOB commander, but the 
SOTF commander should approve medium-risk CONOPs requiring rotary-wing and ISR 
assets. Assign approval authority of the high-risk CONOPs to the SOTF commander, 
with the caveat of keeping the CJSOTF commander informed of the operation. 
3. Implement a targeting procedure by the SOTF staff to closely track critical 
high-demand resources, specifically rotary-wing and ISR assets. Utilize the targeting 
procedure to drive the CONOP process, in order to maximize visibility of critical 
resources, and increase the SOTF’s competitiveness for non-organic assets. 
4. Attach more rotary-wing and ISR assets to the SOTFs. There is creditable 
evidence in this study that Special Forces units require more of these non-organic 
resources in order to maintain operational agility in combat, which would also further 
accelerate CONOP approval. 
Finally, there is the issue of relationships between commanders and their 
subordinates. Although the scope of this study did not address the relationships between 
commanders and their subordinates, trust is a theme in many of the comments left by the 
                                                 
31 The 5W is a simple word document that states the Who (the SFODA), What (the mission), When 
(the time of the operation and specific timeline), Where (the place of the operation), and Why (the purpose) 
of the operation.  The 5W also addresses MEDEVAC and communications frequencies for an SFODA 
operation. 
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subjects in this survey. Indeed, the CONOP, in many ways, could be a manifestation of 
the lack of trust commanders have in their detachments. Many would argue that this is 
not true and that there is little evidence to support such a claim. Nevertheless, the 
perception exists that detachment commanders are not trusted as much by their 
commanders to the full extent when compared to that of their conventional counterpart, 
the infantry rifle company commander. A quote by a lieutenant colonel states that the 
CONOP is a product of the lack of trust between commanders and the detachment 
commanders. 
The CONOP was used by some (all?) for control purposes. ODAs used 
tricks to get out from under that control like submitting a Level 0 when 
they knew full well they would take fire and at some point go into a Level 
2- because they knew their commander wouldn’t approve a Level 2 and/or 
it would take too long. CONOPs and other types of control measures point 
to a level of distrust in subordinate units. I don’t think CONOPs are evil in 
and of themselves- but they are a product of a lack of trust.32 
Similarly, a sergeant major hints to relationship between commanders and the 
SFODA. Again, trust is a theme in his statement. 
There are many variables to consider in the CONOP product, process, and 
approval. Principles: 1. The responsibility of the leader to balance the 
information requirement versus the information desire, this extends and 
relates to whether the ODA is distracted from mission success because of 
the increased mission requirements. 2. Trust and confidence in 
subordinates to do in depth planning as related the mission, operational 
environment, location, command and control capabilities and political 
impact.33   
The sergeant major is correct in this statement. Is there not sufficient trust today 
between subordinate officers and their commanders to conduct effective planning that 
higher authorities require vast amounts of information in a CONOP? The balance 
between information requirements and information desire must come from higher. Given 
the austere locations of our SFODAs and the lack of face-time between the detachments 
and the commander, the detachment’s CONOP product can instill confidence in the 
                                                 
32 Subject 121. Anonymous Lieutenant Colonel, Special Forces, 18A, Afghanistan veteran, question 
74. 
33 Subject 138. Anonymous Sergeant Major, Special Forces,  18Z, Iraq veteran, question 74.   
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commander and therefore increase the chances of mission approval. A detailed CONOP 
product does project the image of detailed planning by the SFODA. The door swings 
both ways; however, only higher authorities can eliminate information requirements, not 
our SFODAs. 
A sergeant first-class echoes the same sentiment regarding trust in detachment 
commanders. 
The CONOP process has become a show down in PowerPoint ability. The 
information needs to be passed to higher, we all understand this. However, 
higher needs to have developed their subordinate commanders and have 
TRUST in their decision making abilities. There needs to be a lot less 
micromanaging of an ODA by BN and GRP level commands. This issue 
may not be a CONOP related issue and may boil down to SF commanders 
training and mentoring their own replacements to make decisions that are 
at or above their levels of operations.34  
Again, this quote hints to the relationships between detachment commanders and 
their AOB and SOTF commanders. Indeed, this sergeant first-class states that the level of 
scrutiny and micro-management of our detachments, which is manifested into the 
CONOP product and the level of approval authority, has potentially resulted from the 
lack of confidence in subordinate commanders. He also states that this lack of confidence 
may be a direct result of the lack of mentoring, counseling, and leadership from higher 
authority. The CONOP product projects the image of the detachment and its level of 
planning to the commander. Does a good CONOP package always equal a good SFODA? 
Does the CONOP tell the commander enough about that SFODA so that he is 
comfortable with mission approval? Indeed, the CONOP is a method that detachments 
can use to project confidence in the commander; however, mentoring and training are the 
preferred methods mentioned by the sergeant first-class. The result now is a CONOP 
package with fewer information requirements because the commander knows his 
SFODAs. 
Green Berets, whether they are officers, NCOs, or warrant officers, were specially 
selected because of their maturity, professionalism, intellect, physical capabilities, and 
                                                 
34 Subject 28. Anonymous Sergeant First Class, Special Forces, 18C, Iraq veteran, question 74.   
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temperament. Indeed, these characteristics are carried proudly within the regiment and 
make Special Forces among the greatest branches amongst the services. Despite the 
undertones of the lack of trust between subordinates and commanders, these quiet 
professionals continue to execute the mission without objection to the current CONOP 
procedure. Let this study speak for the detachments and let our commanders empower 
them once again by implementing the recommendations of this study. 
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APPENDIX B. THE RECOMMENDED TARGETING 
PROCEDURE 
A. THE TARGETING METHODOLOGY 
According to JP 1-02, a target is defined as an entity or object considered for 
possible engagement or other action.   Most targets that drive operations typically revolve 
around direct action raids or cordon and search operations and require rotary wing 
support for infiltration. Additionally, these types of operations require ISR platforms for 
the SFODAs to increase the situational awareness for the ground force commander, 
which in return decreases the risk associated with direct action raids. The targets 
associated with direct action operations are prioritized by the battalion commander’s 
operational priorities and selected by the battalion commander for approval. This is 
conducted through targeting, which is defined as the process of selecting and prioritizing 
targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational 
requirements and capabilities.35   
The targeting sequence identifies enemy vulnerabilities or enemy advantages that 
can be exploited and prosecuted by the SFODAs. It also allows the commander and 
battalion staff to effectively forecast future operations, which increases time for the staff 
to synchronize operations with other SFODAs or friendly forces in the battle space and 
request rotary wing support and ISR platforms in support of the battalion’s operations. At 
the conclusion of the targeting meeting, the targets that are approved are deconflicted and 
posted to the calendar by the battalion staff. Approved targets meet the battalion 
commander’s operational priorities and objective, are nested under the battalion 
commander’s intent, and provide effects for the battle space owner. 
B. THE SOTF COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE AND INTENT 
Targeting is designed around the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) 
methodology. D3A is a cycle that portrays an analytical and systematic approach to 
                                                 
35 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-
02.Department of Defense, November 8, 2010, 325. 
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achieve operational objectives.   It is a methodology that emphasizes attacking the enemy 
at the right time with the correct asset. Figure 30 is a diagram that represents the D3A 
methodology.  
 
Figure 30.  The D3A and the F3EAD Targeting Cycle. 
Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) is a methodology 
within D3A that enables commanders to organize resources and array forces across the 
range of operations. While the targeting aspect of F3EAD is consistent with the D3A 
methodology, F3EAD provides the maneuver commander an additional tool to address 
certain targeting challenges, particularly those found in a counterinsurgency 
environment.36   Figure 30 demonstrates how F3EAD is nested into the D3A targeting 
cycle. 
                                                 
36 Department of Defense, The Targeting Process: Field Manual (FM) 3-60.  (Headquarters 
Department of the Army, November 2010), B-1. 
 73 
The planning activities of the SFODA, the AOB, and SOTF take place under the 
decide and detect functions of D3A and the find function of F3EAD. Due to the 
decentralized structure of the Special Forces battalion, the bulk of planning for actioning 
particular targets is primarily conducted by the SFODAs with the military decision 
process. Resource allocation, which is centralized at the SOTF level, is then allocated to 
the SFODAs and AOBs with the targets that are nested under the battalion commander’s 
operational priorities. Due to the nature of resource allocation primarily distributed 
during the CONOP procedure, the scope of this targeting chapter is primarily focused on 
the decide portion of the targeting cycle, which is where resources should be allocated to 
the SFODAs prior to CONOP submission. 
C. DISSEMINATING THE COMMANDER’S OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES 
It is primarily up to the staff to keep the operational priorities of the commander 
constantly up to date and disseminated down the detachments. Operational priorities are 
best identified by the staff during targeting meetings rather than the CONOP sequence. 
SFODAs and their operations run the risk of delay if operational priorities are not 
disseminated accurately and in a timely manner by the SOTF. According to the survey, 
subjects stated that detachments did always receive approval because the operation was 
not nested.37  Correlation was used to identify relationships between CONOP delay and 
whether the staff was disseminating the commander’s operational priorities.38  The 
results demonstrated significant relationship.39  What this correlation means is there is a 
significant relationship between operational priorities that are not disseminated or 
understood by the SFODAs and CONOP approval delay. 
                                                 
37 Question 45: The mean for Afghanistan was 2.9 while the mean for Iraq was 2.6. On the likert 
scale, 3 was considered once in a while. 
38 Question 15: The mean for Afghanistan was 5.9 while the mean for Iraq was 6.6. On the likert 
scale, 5 was half of the time and 7 was most of the time. 
39 Correlation coefficient measures the degree of linear association between two variables. Linear 
correlation coefficient is the quantity between -1 and +1. This quantity is denoted by R. The closer to R +1 
the stronger positive (direct) correlation and similarly the closer to R -1 the stronger (negative) inverse 
correlation exists between the two variables. See Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan, Understanding 
Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide, 24–25. 
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Figure 31.  Correlation between CONOP delay and Disseminating the Commander’s 
Operational Priorities to the SFODAs. 
When competition for resources is high, the commander will prioritize CONOPs 
and targets according to his operational priorities. The staff must be constantly updating 
these priorities and disseminating them to the SFODA. This will not only directs 
operations for the SFODAs, but prevents delay when CONOPs are submitted for 
approval. 
D. THE TARGETING MEETING 
Under the decide function of D3A, the targeting meeting takes place. The future 
operations (FUOPS) cell is responsible for the conduct of the targeting meeting which 
organizes the targets in support of the commander’s objectives. The targeting meeting is 
the method for deconflicting targets that overlap on the calendar, assigning the required 
assets to the targets, demonstrating which targets are nested under the commander’s 
intent, and synchronizing targets with other detachments or adjacent units in the area of 
operations (AO). Figure 32 is a diagram of a typical agenda for a targeting meeting in 
Special Forces battalion. 
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Figure 32.  The Targeting Meeting Agenda. 
During this meeting the FUOPS cell reviews the battalion commander’s intent, 
operational priorities and the prioritized operational CONOPs that have been approved. 
Next, the FUOPS cell briefs regional commander (COMRC) and the conventional BSOs 
operational priorities. The review is essential in order to demonstrate how SFODAs are 
nested and how the battalion is balancing operations in order to provide effects for the 
CJSOTF commander and the conventional forces in battle space. 
Next, the FUOPS cell reviews all the targets in the deck. Typically, these targets 
are categorized as lethal and non-lethal and are organized geographically or by AOB. The 
FUOPS cell then posts targets to a calendar and demonstrates which targets conflict in 
time and with the battalion’s organic assets. The FUOPS cell will prioritize the targets for 
the commander based on the operational priorities and the commander’s intent and make 
a recommendation to the commander for approval at the conclusion of the targeting 
meeting. The targets for approval are posted to a calendar for the commander. Figure 33 
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is an example of a calendar which shows a battalion forecasting operations at least four 
weeks out for execution. This gives the FUOPs cell time to resource targets that cannot 
be supported by the battalion’s organic assets and meet the commander’s intent and 
support his operational priorities. 
Weeks One and Two demonstrate a timeline of targets submitted to a battalion 
through the targets approval. Weeks three through six, which are empty on the calendar, 
will already have CONOPs approved for execution from a previous targeting meeting. 
Weeks seven and eight demonstrate the window for execution this particular targeting 
meeting. 
 
Figure 33.  Targeting Calendar. 
The targeting meeting is concluded with the battalion commander approving 
targets for execution. The FUOPS cell returns the targets to the SFODAs through the 
AOBs for CONOP production. Not all targets can be supported with organic assets 
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during the window of execution. The FUOPS cell will request resources through the 
regional command (RC) for the targets that cannot be executed with the battalion’s 
organic assets. The advantage of forecasting operations out at least four weeks through a 
targeting meeting is increasing resource allocation for the battalion’s SFODAs. 
Furthermore, the detachments can save time by not initiating CONOP production due to 
the potential unavailability of non-organic assets.   
E. TARGETING MEETING MEMBERSHIP 
The targeting meeting is a critical event for the SOTF staff. It not only drives 
CONOP production, but demonstrates to the commander how combat power is being 
projected across the AO and how resources are being used to support operations. The 
targeting meeting is integrated into the battalion commander’s battle rhythm. Prior to 
initiating the battalion targeting meeting, the FUOPS cells will hold a preliminary 
targeting meeting in order to prioritize the targets according to the commander’s intent 
and operational priorities and allocate resources to the targets. This will alert the FUOPs 
cell to which targets cannot be supported with the battalion’s organic assets. 
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Table 3.   Preliminary Targeting Meeting Proposed Membership. 
The preliminary targeting meeting does not require the majority of the staff to be 
present. Its purpose is primarily to prepare for the battalion targeting meeting by briefing 
the S3. Attendees are listed in Table 3. Attendance to the preliminary meeting is not 
inclusive and more members of the staff are encouraged to attend if time is permitted. At 
the conclusion of the preliminary meeting, the FUOPS will adjust the targeting calendar 
according to the S3 guidance and finalize preparations for the actual targeting meeting 
with the SOTF commander. 
The actual targeting meeting can be held the same day as the preliminary meeting 
or several days afterward, depending on the SOTF commander’s and the SOTF’s current 
battle rhythm. Nevertheless, it is important to hold a preliminary meeting prior to having 
the actual targeting meeting. The board membership to the targeting meeting is extensive 
and Table 4 lists the personnel who should formally attend. Again, the list is not all 
inclusive, but maximum participation is essential. 
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Table 4.   The Targeting Meeting Group Membership. 
During the targeting meeting, the FUOPS cell will brief both lethal and non-lethal 
targets to the SOTF commander. At this time, those targets that have resources attached 
have been placed on a calendar or a synchronization matrix. Resource requests have been 
initiated to the RC by the FUOPS cell for other targets that cannot be supported by the 
SOTF. Targets may conflict in time with the SOTF’s resources, so the FUOPS cell will 
recommend to the SOTF commander and the staff which targets should be supported 
based on the commander’s intent and the current operational priorities. The FUOPS cell 
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briefs which targets are currently being outsourced through the RC. Approved targets are 
then returned to the SFODAs through the AOBs for CONOP production. 
Figure 34 shows and example of a lethal targeting slide. This slide contains all of the 
relevant information that the FUOPS cell would need to forecast the operation and justify 
the resources, specifically rotary wing and ISR. This targeting slide does not have to be 
limited to direction raids involving the capturing of high value targets. Detachments can 
also implement terrain based effects for the commander, rather than enemy based effects, 
for Figure 34. Table 5 briefly explains Figure 34. 
1. Lethal Targeting Slide 
 
Figure 34.  Lethal Targeting Slide. 
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Table 5.   Lethal Target Slide Description. 
Targeting meetings can demonstrate a balance between lethal and non-lethal 
effects, depending on the operational environment and the commander’s operational 
priorities. Figure 35 shows an example of a non-lethal targeting slide and Table 6 will 
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demonstrate its description. Non-lethal targets can be nominated by the detachment, the 
tactical psychological operations team (TPT), or the civilian affairs teams (CAT). At the 
SOTF level, organizing and resourcing non-lethal targeting slides should fall under the 
Civilian Affairs officer who works in the FUOPs cell. 
 
Figure 35.  Non-Lethal Targeting Slide. 
 83 
 
Table 6.   Non-Lethal Targeting Slide Description. 
The lethal and non-lethal slides are recommendations for the FUOPS cell when 
conducting targeting meetings with the SOTF commander. These slides are only 
recommendations and can vary with each unit; however, it is recommended that each 
targeting slide contain a window for execution and the resource requirements for 
servicing the target. When competing for resources, forecasting and justification for using 
resources are key to obtaining them for the detachments from the RC. 
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APPENDIX C. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. Where were you deployed most recently when you were exposed to the 
CONOP process? 
 A. Afghanistan  
 B. Iraq  
 C. Other (Please explain below)  
 
2. What is your Rank? 
 A. CPT  
 B. MAJ  
 C. LTC  
 D. COL  
 E. SSG  
 F. SFC  
 G. MSG  
 H. SGM  
 I. CSM  
 J. CW1  
 K. CW2  
 L. CW3  
 M. CW4  
 N. Other (Please specify below)  
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3. What is your MOS? 
 A. 18A  
 B. 180A  
 C. 18B  
 D. 18C  
 E. 18D  
 F. 18E 
 G. 18F  
 H. 18Z  
 
4. What is your age? 
5. The battalion staff conducted targeting meetings.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














6. The detachment was required to submit targets up to the battalion staff.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













7. Targeting meetings increased the battalion staff’s oversight of resource 
requirements for CONOPs                                       .  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 














8. Targeting meetings increased the staff’s capability to obtain non-organic assets 
not available to me in the battalion. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 

















9. The Detachment was well informed by the battalion staff of available resources 
before submitting CONOPs. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 













10. The detachment adapted its targeting to the battalion’s changing operational 
priorities.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 













11. The detachment adapted its targeting to the available resources. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 













12. Rotary wing platforms were abundant in support of my detachment’s 
operations.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 













13. ISR platforms were abundant in support of my detachment’s operations.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-being strongly DISAGREE to 9 being Strongly 














14. The detachment understood the battalion commander’s operational priorities. 
 Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-












15. The battalion staff disseminated the battalion commander’s operational 
priorities.  
 93 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













16. The battalion staff disseminated the operational priorities of the regional 
commander so that the SFODA may nest the CONOP. 
 Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-














17. The battalion staff disseminated the operational priorities of conventional 
forces so that the SFODA may nest the CONOP.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













18. The detachment was in direct contact with the SF Battalion to coordinate 
rotary wing assets in order to support the CONOP.  
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Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













19. The detachment coordinated through the AOB for rotary wing assets in order 
to support the CONOP.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














20. The detachment coordinated through the AOB for ISR in order to support the 
CONOP.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













21. The detachment was in direct contact with the SF Battalion to coordinate 
rotary wing assets in order to support the CONOP. 
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Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













22. The detachment was in contact with the SF Battalion to coordinate ISR assets 
in order to develop intelligence for the CONOP. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














23. The detachment was in contact with the SF Battalion to coordinate ISR assets 
in order to support the operation.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













24. The battalion staff coordinated for assets required to support the CONOP prior 
to CONOP submission. 
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Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













25. The detachment directly coordinated with other units for rotary wing support 
before going through SF battalion in order to support the CONOP.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














26. The battalion staff synchronized the detachment’s operation with adjacent 
units before CONOP submission.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













27. The detachment synchronized operations with adjacent units before CONOP 
submission.  
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Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













28. Before submitting a CONOP, the detachment was planning within at 
least…____ prior to CONOP submission.  
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 12 Hours; 2= 24 hours; 3=2–3 Days; 4= 
4–5 Days; 5=6–7 Days; 6= 2 Weeks; 7= 3 Weeks; 8= 1 Month; 9= More than a Month; 














29. After submitting the detachment’s targets to battalion, the staff provided 
accurate feedback to the detachment through the AOBs within... _____. 
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 12 Hours; 2= 24 hours; 3=2–3 Days; 4= 
4–5 Days; 5=6–7 Days; 6= 2 Weeks; 7= 3 Weeks; 8= 1 Month; 9= Never. The SFODA 














30. Before submitting a CONOP, the battalion staff wanted to know what the 
detachment was planning, to include the required resources, at least...____ prior to 
CONOP submission.  
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 12 Hours; 2= 24 Hours; 3= 48 Hours; 4= 
3–5 Days; 5= 6–7 Days; 6= 2 Weeks; 7= 3 Weeks; 8= 4 Weeks or More;  9= Never. The 














31. In order to compete for rotary wing and ISR, the detachment submitted 
CONOPs that required rotary wing and ISR for concurrence…____prior to mission 
execution.  
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 12 Hours; 2= 24 Hours; 3= 48 Hours; 4= 
3–5 Days; 5= 6–7 Days; 6= 2 Weeks; 7= 3 Weeks; 8= 4 Weeks or More;  9= There was 














32. The detachment would coordinate through the AOB and battalion staff for 
rotary wing and ISR at least…____prior to CONOP submission.  
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 week to 9= 9 or more weeks; 10 - 














33. Rotary wing and ISR assets were pulled in support of other CONOPs.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













34. The detachment’s CONOPs were “pushed to the right” as a result of the 
scarcity of ISR/ Rotary wing assets.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














35. Coordinations for assets that the SFODA required for the operation were 
submitted with the CONOP at the same time to the battalion staff.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














36. CONOPs requiring rotary wing support that the detachment submitted were 
approved for the CONOPs original time of execution. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













37. CONOPs requiring ISR that the detachment submitted were approved for the 
CONOPs original time of execution.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














38. The detachment adapted CONOP planning to the battalion’s changes in 
operational priorities.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














39. The detachment adapted CONOP planning to the battalion’s changes in 
available resources.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













40. The battalion commander decided which operations were resourced with 
organic assets when the CONOP was briefed for concurrence.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














41. The battalion staff coordinated for non-organic assets in support of the 
detachment’s operation after the CONOP was briefed to the commander for concurrence. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














42. The battalion staff synchronized the operation with adjacent units after 
CONOP submission.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













43. The detachment synchronized operations with adjacent units after CONOP 
submission.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














44. The Commander and battalion staff prioritized CONOPs for concurrence in 
support of operational priorities.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














45. The detachment did not receive concurrence for the CONOP because the 
CONOP was not “nested.”  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













46. Concurrence for an SFODAs Level 0 CONOP typically took… 
(Level 0 CONOP is defined as an operation with Low-risk to the force with little 
potential for political repercussion) 
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= Within the Hour; 2= Within 3 Hours; 3= 
Within 6 Hours;  4= Within 8 Hours; 5= Within 12 Hours; 6= Within 24 Hours; 7= 
Within 48 Hours; 8= 48 Hours or More; 9= The SFODA never submitted a Level 0;  10 - 














47. Concurrence for an SFODAs Level 1 CONOP typically took…  
(Level 1 CONOP is defined as an operation with Medium-risk to the force; 
Requires Rotary Wing Support; Some potential for political repercussion) 
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= Within 24 Hours; 2= Within 48 Hours; 
3= Within 3–5 Days;  4= Within 6–7 Days; 5= Within 10 Days; 6= Within 2 Weeks; 7= 
Within 3 Weeks; 8= Within 1 Month; 9= The SFODA never submitted a Level 1;10 - 














48. Concurrence for an SFODAs Level 2 CONOP typically took…  
(Level 2 CONOP is defined as an operation with High-risk to the force; Requires 
Rotary Wing Support; Strong potential for political repercussion) 
Time is answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= Within 24 Hours; 2= Within 48 Hours; 
3= Within 3–5 Days;  4= Within 6–7 Days; 5= Within 10 Days; 6= Within 2 Weeks; 7= 
Within 3 Weeks; 8= Within 1 Month; 9= The SFODA never submitted a Level 2;10 - 













49. Concurrence took longer for the detachments Level 0 CONOP because (click 
all that apply) 
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 A. Lack of rotary wing support   
 B. Lack of ISR platforms   
 C. Intelligence requirements (HUMINT; SIGINT; IMINT)  
 D. Operation wasn’t nested with BSO   
 E. Operation wasn’t nested with SOTF   
 F. Operation wasn’t synchronized with adjacent units   
 G. Incorrect Font   
 H. Incorrect use of doctrine (tactical tasks and graphic symbols that match)   
 I. Incorrect mission statement (5W)   
 J. The operational plan was not clear with the use of graphics and doctrine (not 
enough detail)  
 K. Lack of graphic fire control measures   
 L. Incorrect formatting and packaging of slides   
 M. Operation was not deconflcited with adjacent units   
 N. Other (Please explain below)  
 
50. Concurrence took longer for the detachments Level 1 CONOP because (click 
all that apply) 
 A. Lack of rotary wing support   
 B. Lack of ISR platforms   
 C. Intelligence requirements (HUMINT; SIGINT; IMINT)  
 D. Operation wasn’t nested with BSO   
 E. Operation wasn’t nested with SOTF   
 F. Operation wasn’t synchronized with adjacent units   
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 G. Incorrect Font   
 H. Incorrect use of doctrine ( tactical tasks and graphic symbols that match)   
 I. Incorrect mission statement (5W)   
 J. The operational plan was not clear with the use of graphics and doctrine (not 
enough detail)  
 K. Lack of graphic fire control measures   
 L. Incorrect formatting and packaging of slides   
 M. Operation was not deconflcited with adjacent units   
 N. Other (Please explain below)  
 
51. Concurrence took longer for the detachments Level 2 CONOP because (click 
all that apply) 
 A. Lack of rotary wing support   
 B. Lack of ISR platforms   
 C. Intelligence requirements (HUMINT; SIGINT; IMINT)  
 D. Operation wasn’t nested with BSO   
 E. Operation wasn’t nested with SOTF   
 F. Operation wasn’t synchronized with adjacent units   
 G. Incorrect Font   
 H. Incorrect use of doctrine ( tactical tasks and graphic symbols that match)   
 I. Incorrect mission statement (5W)   
 J. The operational plan was not clear with the use of graphics and doctrine (not 
enough detail)  
 K. Lack of graphic fire control measures   
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 L. Lack of graphic fire control measures   
 M. Operation was not deconflcited with adjacent units   
 N. Other (Please explain below)  
 
52. The CONOP sequence for resource allocation was effective when resources 
were ABUNDANT.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













53. The CONOP Sequence for resource allocation was effective when resources 
were SCARCE.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














54. The CONOP sequence was effective for synchronization of operations with 
adjacent units.  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














55. The CONOP sequence was effective for deconfliction of operations with 
adjacent units. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 













56. The CONOP sequence was effective for planning future operations in a 
Special Forces battalion. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














57. The CONOP sequence was effective in providing staff oversight to resource 
requirements for future operations in a Special Forces battalion. 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1-Never, 3- once in a while, 5-half the time, 7-most 














58. Who should have approval authority for a Level 0 CONOP? 
(Level 0 CONOP is defined as an operation with Low-risk to the force with little 
potential for political repercussion) 
 A. Detachment Commander  
 B. AOB Commander  
 C. Battalion Commander  
 D. Group Commander  
 E. Other (Please explain below)  
 
59. Who should have approval authority for a Level 1 CONOP? 
(Level 1 CONOP is defined as an operation with Medium-risk to the force; 
Requires Rotary Wing Support; Some potential for political repercussion) 
 A. Detachment Commander  
 B. AOB Commander  
 C. Battalion Commander  
 D. Group Commander  
 E. Other (Please explain below)  
 
60. Who should have approval authority for a Level 2 CONOP? 
(Level 2 CONOP is defined as an operation with High-risk to the force; Requires 
Rotary Wing Support; Strong potential for political repercussion) 
 A. Detachment Commander  
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 B. AOB Commander  
 C. Battalion Commander  
 D. Group Commander  
 E. Other (Please explain below)  
 
61. Should the CONOP be terminated in lieu of a 5W (Who, What, When, Where 
and Why)? (YES/NO; Why or Why not?) 
 A. Yes  
 B. No  
 
62. Under what conditions should we use the CONOP procedure? (Click all that 
apply) 
 A. Anytime we have the capability to send data   
 B. SOF integration with conventional forces   
 C. SOF integration with host nation partnered forces   
 D. When conducting FID   
 E. When conducting DA   
 F. When conducting UW   
 G. When conducting Reconnaissance   
 H. When conducting Patrols   
 I. Other (Please explain below)  
 
63. On average, how many slides were in your Level 0 CONOP during your last 
deployment?  
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Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 slide; 2= 2–3 slides; 3= 4–5 slides; 5 = 6–8 
slides; 6= 9–13 slides; 7= 14–18 slides; 8= 19–23 slides; 9=24 or more slides; 10- Don’t 













64. On average, how many slides were in your Level 1 CONOP during your last 
deployment? 
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 slide; 2= 2–3 slides; 3= 4–5 slides; 5 = 6–8 
slides; 6= 9–13 slides; 7= 14–18 slides; 8= 19–23 slides; 9=24 or more slides; 10- Don’t 














65. On average, how many slides were in your Level 2 CONOP during your last 
deployment?  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 slide; 2= 2–3 slides; 3= 4–5 slides; 5 = 6–8 
slides; 6= 9–13 slides; 7= 14–18 slides; 8= 19–23 slides; 9=24 or more slides; 10- Don’t 














66. How many slides should be in a Level 0 CONOP?  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 slide; 2= 2–3 slides; 3= 4–5 slides; 5 = 6–8 
slides; 6= 9–13 slides; 7= 14–18 slides; 8= 19 or more slides; 9= No set limit; 10= Don’t 













67. How many slides should be in a Level 1 CONOP?  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 slide; 2= 2–3 slides; 3= 4–5 slides; 5 = 6–8 
slides; 6= 9–13 slides; 7= 14–18 slides; 8= 19 or more slides; 9= No set limit; 10= Don’t 














68. How many slides should be in a Level 2 CONOP?  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 slide; 2= 2–3 slides; 3= 4–5 slides; 5 = 6–8 
slides; 6= 9–13 slides; 7= 14–18 slides; 8= 19 or more slides; 9= No set limit; 10= Don’t 














69. How many times did the CONOP format change over your previous 
deployment?  
Answered on a scale of 1–10 (1= 1 time, 2= 2 times, etc; 9= 9 or more times; 10- 













70. Should there be one standard for the CONOP structure? (Yes/No; Why or 
Why Not?) 
 A. Yes  
 B. No  
 
71. Should the CONOP be put into doctrine? (Yes/No Why or Why Not?) 
 A. Yes  
 B. No  
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72. If the CONOP Level 1 and 2 should be codified, what are the minimum 
components that need to be included? 
 A. Cover slide   
 B. Timeline   
 C. TASKORG   
 D. Terrain Orientation: (AO, AI, AOI  
 E. Enemy CAS capabilities, IDF capabilities, and RESERVE elements   
 F. Terrain: OAKOC   
 G. Weather   
 H. Civil Considerations   
 I. Composition of Threat and Disposition of Threat  
 J. Capabilities of Threat by War Fighting Function  
 K. Enemy Purpose   
 L. Enemy Form of Maneuver   
 M. Enemy Elements Task and Purpose  
 N. Enemy Endstate  
 O. Friendly Higher Commanders Intent   
 P. Friendly Higher’s Mission 1 and 2 levels up   
 Q. Friendly Higher’s Concept   
 R. SFODA Commanders Mission   
 S. SFODA Commanders Intent   
 T. SFODA COA Statement   
 U. SFODA Purpose   
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 V. SFODA Form of Maneuver   
 
73. If the CONOP Level 1 and 2 should be codified, what are the minimum 
components that need to be included? (Continued) 
 A. SFODA Decisive point and why   
 B. Friendly Risk (discusses risk and means to mitigate)   
 C. SFODA (or friendly) DO T/P   
 D. SFODA (or friendly) SO1 T/P   
 E. SFODA (or friendly) SO2 T/P   
 F. SFODA Endstate  
 G. Concept of the Operation (typically expressed by Phase and in conjunction 
with the COA statement) 1 Slide   
 H. Scheme of Maneuver (detailed employment of maneuver units) 1 Slide per 
phase to express mission from beginning to end   
 I. Friendly actions with correct doctrinal symbols   
 J. Enemy actions with correct symbols   
 K. Graphic Fire Control Measures   
 L. Air space coordination measures   
 M. Rules of engagement   
 N. Themes and Messages   
 O. Synch Matrix   
 P. Logistical support requirements, supply rates, and prestockage of class III, IV, 
and V supplies   
 Q. Guidance on the movement of detainees   
 R. MEDEVAC plan   
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 S. Friendly forces information requirements   
 T. Position of the commander and succession of command   
 U. Frequencies   
 V. Other (Please Specify)  
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